Now that Barack Obama is making the sort of appointments John McCain would have made—mainstream centrists from the political establishment—I can perhaps stop worrying about “change we can believe in.” The president-elect himself will be the only unknown quantity in the mix, and the appointments suggest he may turn out to be little distinguishable from George W. Bush both in foreign policy (force where necessary, but diplomacy when there is any hope for it at all), and economic policy (throw money at problems, in proportion to the public perception of the problem’s urgency).
Mr. Obama will say and sometimes do ghastly things in social policy—be verbally as “pro-choice” as Mr. Bush has been “pro-life”—but this is unlikely to make much difference. Social policy is out of a president’s hands. He makes symbolic statements, to assuage his key constituencies, as all politicians do. But as we are reminded by the California court challenge against the result of the state referendum on same-sex marriage, the real decision-making has been taken out of the hands of voters, and put in the hands of elite judges and lawyers. The will to confront this extra-constitutional migration of power was not there, even under Reagan.
Mr. Bush was a typical centrist politician, who suddenly had to face unprecedented circumstances on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001. He distinguished himself (according to me) by the courage and decision with which he addressed the issue thus raised. America and the West had just proved extremely vulnerable to large-scale terrorist assault by low-tech Islamist fanatics, and we would have to go after them.
Rhetorical posturing aside, there is not 28 grams of difference between Bush and Obama, between Republicans and Democrats generally, on the main point. The question is not whether to go after the Islamist enemy, but how. Mr. Bush’s approach, which included changing a regime in Iraq as well as Afghanistan to tilt the balance of power in the Middle East away from the crazies, was more or less inevitable. As I wrote at the time, we (in the targeted West) had to start clearing the Augean stables of the Middle East, and Iraq was the natural place to start. That the job would be thankless we could take for granted.
Mr. Bush distinguished himself by the energy he devoted to the task, by his refusal to be discouraged or intimidated, and finally by his spine in embracing the Iraq “surge” when all seemed lost, and public opinion had turned hard against him.
Mr. Obama comes to power facing an economic mess, that he is bound to make worse by the conventional political response—by throwing money, in the form of huge bailouts to secure the greatest fortresses of extravagance and incompetence, thus locking the recession in. Mr. Bush was already doing the same.
But Mr. Obama will also face a post-Bush world in which—as we’ve been reminded in Mumbai—the Islamists have retained their “asymmetrical” ability to trigger international catastrophes. He will begin his term with a bit of luck, however. The recessionary collapse of the oil price is a bigger setback for the unfriendly oil-dependent powers of Russia, Iran, Arabia, Venezuela, than for oil consumers. And the recession itself hurts export-dependent China more than it can importers. In other words, the adversaries of the West are in worse shape than we are, and over the next few years, we may see the range and depth of advanced modern economies vindicated.
The designation of Hillary Clinton to the State Department has been criticized by Mr. Obama’s own allies for the threat it brings of exacerbating the usual tensions between White House and State. Ms. Clinton could conceivably undermine any foreign policy direction Mr. Obama offers. But more likely, he won’t offer much, for his own foreign policy ideas are incoherent.
A long time has passed since we watched a brilliant U.S. foreign strategy unfold, through the symbiosis between, say, a Reagan and George Schultz, bringing down the Evil Empire, or say, a Truman and Dean Acheson creating the international institutions to secure the post-war West against the earlier advance of communism. President Bush was unfortunate in both his choices for secretary of state—both tactical rather than strategic thinkers, when Bush himself in all his glorious “simplisme” was strategic.
Ms. Clinton has likewise a tactical and reactive mind, plus what may prove a vacuum behind her. She has been close enough to the centre of power to understand the stakes for American error and indecision. She will avoid any response to events that might look “weak.” But she will not supply a fixed view towards achievable results a few years down the road. Instead I expect, overall, the characteristic Clintonian drift of theatrical, “decisive-looking” half-measures.
- Robin Hoodism is on the rise - Sunday January 2, 2011 at 9:35 am
- Taking on the Reformation - Wednesday December 29, 2010 at 8:53 am
- The miserly Canadian - Wednesday December 22, 2010 at 5:23 am
